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Abstract 
 
In May 2011 the Danish minority government successfully obtained the support of the 
Danish People’s Party to carry out a comprehensive pension reform. In return, it was 
agreed that Denmark would reintroduce border controls. However, this appeared to 
be at odds with the Schengen Agreement and prompted a heated response from 
Berlin and Brussels. The Danish government had to backtrack and insist that the 
proposed initiatives would not violate the Schengen acquis. This paper examines 
how  a purely domestic issue galvanized into a strong diplomatic  pressure on 
Denmark, and what that tells us of modern diplomacy in an integrated Europe. It 
argues that by linking its pension reform with border controls, the Danish government 
introduced the international level into its national negotiations. This illustrates that the 
two levels cannot be kept entirely separate in the European Union and diplomacy 
increasingly becomes a part of daily policy-making. 
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The debacle over Danish border controls: interplay between national and 
European politics  
 
In the spring of 2011 a most peculiar string of events unfolded that originated in the 
attempts by the Danish government to find parliamentary support to pass a pension 
reform, and culminated in heated diplomatic exchanges with its European partners 
who feared that Denmark was about to violate the Schengen Agreement which had 
abolished border controls.  How did a rather obscure domestic issue become a 
matter of contention between the Danish government, the European Commission 
and other European countries? And what does this recent series of events tell us 
about how modern diplomacy is conducted in the context of an unfolding process 
of European integration? 
 
In order to understand why  the Danish government became embroiled in this 
diplomatic controversy we must appreciate how the process of European integra-
tion brings national politics and European-level negotiations closer together. 
Essentially,  the Danish government tried to have it both ways by promising 
concessions to the nationalist Danish People's Party (DPP) in the form of a tightening 
of border controls in return for its support for a pension reform, while insisting vis-à-vis 
its European partners that it would abide strictly to the Schengen Agreement. 
 
The inconsistency of this position soon became evident when the other European 
countries began to fret over the prospects of Denmark ‘reintroducing border controls’ 
as the Danish People's Party proudly proclaimed in national news media. Traditionally, 
international relations are portrayed as a separate sphere of ‘high politics’ utterly 
distinct form national-level domestic politics. As the Danish example highlights, the 
advent of European cooperation has changed that dramatically. Hence, diplomacy 
must take into account the interplay between domestic and European politics. 
 
This is best done with recourse to the two-level game theoretical framework 
developed by Robert Putnam.1 This approach was subsequently applied to a variety 
of analytical approaches where international negotiations and European politics are 
nested in a broader context which must take into account political considerations at 
                                                 
1 R.D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games”, International 
Organization, vol. 42, no. 3, 1988, pp. 427-460. EU Diplomacy Paper 1/2012 
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least at the domestic and international level.2 This paper thus applies the two-level 
games framework to the debacle over the reintroduction of border controls in 
Denmark in May 2011 and considers the broader implications for diplomacy and 
European politics. It argues that the Danish government, in order to carry through 
with its pension reform, linked it to the issue of border controls, thus introducing the 
international level into its ongoing domestic negotiations in order to overcome the 
deadlock. The Danish government attempted to present one version of the border 
control agreement to the national audience to appease the DPP and a softer 
version to its European partners. However, this failed as the heavy-handed 
interpretation of the new border regime expounded in particular by the DPP that it 
would ostensibly reintroduce border controls generated  much apprehension in 
Europe. Faced with the prospect of losing much of its political clout in Brussels or 
losing a trial at the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the government retracted from 
its position and sought a solution that would maintain the support of the DPP while 
putting fears to rest concerning the Schengen-compatibility of the agreement on 
border controls.  
 
Games with two levels 
 
The two-level game framework developed by Robert Putnam has become a 
standard theoretical apparatus for studying how international relations are affected 
by domestic politics.3 At its heart, the approach puts the need to move beyond the 
simple observation that domestic and international concerns often interrelate with 
each other. Putnam's two-level game approach is thus an attempt to develop a 
more rigorous understanding of how the inter-linkages between international 
relations and national politics work, rather than merely concluding out of anecdotal 
evidence that they exist.  
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring 
the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power 
by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, 
national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy 
domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign 
                                                 
2 For example, P.B. Evans, HK. Jacobson and R.D. Putnam (eds.), Double-Edged Diplomacy: 
International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993; 
A.R.  Young, "What Game? By Which Rules? Adaptation and Flexibility in the EC's Foreign 
Economic Policy", in M. Knodt and S. Princen (eds.), Understanding the European Union's 
External Relations, London, Routledge, 2003, pp. 54-71. 
3 Putnam, op.cit. Malthe Munkøe 
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developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central 
decision-makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet 
sovereign.4 
 
States are seldom unitary actors. When one representative conducts negotiations at 
the international level, he or she will usually be dependent on getting the eventual 
deal accepted at home. The U.S. President will need to get Congress to ratify an 
international  treaty, for example, and his entire international position may be 
undermined if that fails, as President Woodrow Wilson’s failure to get Congress to 
accept American accession to the League of Nation famously demonstrated. As a 
result, a negotiator must conduct negotiations with internal stakeholders or at least 
bear the domestic situation in mind before and while negotiating at the international 
level. More often than not negotiators spend as much time building alliances and 
balancing concerns at the domestic level as they do in head-to-head negotiations 
with their counterparts at the international level. 
 
This logic can be applied to the EU, where countries negotiate with each other on 
matters of great interest to domestic interest groups and the populace at large. The 
interplays between national and international concerns are therefore obvious. Many 
sectors have become integrated, in particular in relation to the single  market. 
Accordingly, a single country cannot amend, say, its business legislation dramatically 
on its own since the area has been made the subject of EU-level legislation. In this 
sense, as European integration progresses, more and more sectors become 
increasingly subjected to the logic of a game at two levels. That is to say, the inter-
linkages between the two levels become more pronounced and the costs of 
ignoring either rise as the integration process unfolds.   
 
This dynamic is particularly strong at the European level, where European integration 
over the past couple of decades has reinforced the inter-linkages between 
domestic politics and international relations. Putnam explicitly mentions the neo-
functionalist approach to European integration,  as developed by Ernst Haas,  to 
describe how integration creates self-reinforcing  ‘spillovers’  as examples of 
international relations theories that acknowledge the interplay between international 
                                                 
4 Ibid., p. 434. EU Diplomacy Paper 1/2012 
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and domestic factors.5 The underlying logic is that once a certain area has become 
integrated, it will create incentives to integrate in other areas in order to obtain the 
full benefits. In other words,  domestic circumstances create a pressure on the 
international level. The recent euro crisis may be a case in  point. A common 
currency has created some benefits, but also a strong pressure for integrating fiscal 
policy as well. The functionalist schools of European integration also emphasize that 
domestic pressure groups will push this logic further by demanding integration that 
will benefit their economic interests. Once a certain area has become integrated, 
therefore, it generates a pressure to integrate other areas. This provides incentives for 
political elites or pressure groups and economic interest groups to press for further 
integration. This generates a ‘snow-ball effect’ where European integration gradually 
expands. In that respect European integration, according to the neo-functionalist 
theories, is propelled forward primarily by domestic and economic factors. 
 
One of the hallmarks of European integration is the celebrated creation of the single 
market. The Schengen Agreement abolished passport checks on all internal borders. 
It was furthered through numerous pieces of legislation from Brussels and rulings from 
the European Court of Justice that have sought to level the impediments to the four 
freedoms: the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital throughout the 
common market. Border policy is consequently an area which is deeply integrated, 
and hence where domestic politics and international relations/European-level 
politics are not always easily disentangled. In order to understand how Danish plans 
to upgrade border controls engendered a sharp response from the rest of Europe, 
we must look at the domestic and European levels of policy-making. 
 
The domestic level: reforming the pension system 
 
Like its European counterparts, Denmark was badly hit by the economic crisis which 
dawned in 2008 and 2009, and throughout 2011 consolidating public finances has 
been high on the political agenda. The centre-right government sought to pass a 
number of reforms to ensure budgetary compliance with the requirements of the 
Economic and Monetary Union, which puts a ceiling on the overall ratio of public 
                                                 
5 Putnam, op.cit., p. 431. For neo-functionalism, see E.B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, 
Social and Economical Forces 1950-1957, London, Stevens & Sons, 1958. Malthe Munkøe 
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debt to GDP and on the size of public budget deficits. Moreover, a general election 
was due in November 2011 and the centre-right government was trailing in the polls. 
 
Then-Prime Minister Løkke Rasmussen decided to embark on an ambitious strategy of 
putting forward unpopular economic reforms, and in his new year's speech to the 
nation he unveiled plans to cut back on the ‘efterløn’ pension scheme.6 This scheme 
had long been bedeviled by economists for effectively paying people to retire early 
despite the looming shortage of labour generated by societal ageing and because 
of the inherent inefficacy of paying people who are in employment to retire early. 
Others argued, however, that the scheme should be maintained since it allows 
manual workers who begin working at a young age and would otherwise be worn 
down physically by the time they reach the normal retirement age. The 
government's plan was to reform the scheme to save public expenses,  and 
presumably also to present itself as a political bloc the Danes could trust to manage 
the macroeconomy even if it meant making unpopular decisions. 
 
In order for this to work, gaining  the support of the Danish People's Party for the 
pension reform was  imperative. At the time, Denmark was led by a minority 
government consisting of the two largest centre-right parties. As a minority 
government it was necessary to build a majority on a case-by-case basis. The 
government therefore relied on the nationalist DPP for a majority in parliament on 
most political issues, as agreement with the centre-left bloc could be found only on 
centrist or uncontroversial matters. Consequently, in order to pass a reform of the 
‘efterløn’ pension scheme, the DPP would have to be in favour. 
 
But convincing the DPP was not easy. The party has a large share of the blue-collar 
vote, and many of its voters stood to lose from the proposed reform. More generally, 
it had adopted a political stance which implied opposition to immigration combined 
with staunch support for the Danish welfare model and was therefore reluctant to be 
seen backing reforms that would cut back on welfare services. 
 
The negotiations on the ‘efterløn’ pension reform proved arduous. In the end, the 
DPP indicated it was willing to support the reform despite the prospect of electoral 
                                                 
6 M. Munkøe, “Political Change in Denmark? Outlooks on the Snap Election in September 
2011”, Stockholm, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2011. EU Diplomacy Paper 1/2012 
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repercussions, provided it received due compensation. This would need to be a 
concession that could be highly publicized and have a very strong symbolical 
resonance among its voters. Hence,  it demanded the reintroduction of border 
controls, long abolished under the Schengen Agreement of 1995.7  
 
Eventually an agreement was reached that appeased the DPP. The ‘efterløn’ reform 
was  agreed to  in return for a strengthening of border controls. Following the 
agreement, the DPP proudly and very vocally proclaimed that it had ensured a deal 
which would reintroduce border controls. In order to secure support for its much-
vaunted pension reform, the Danish government thus decided on what is often 
termed a negotiation strategy of issue linkage. In isolation, no pension reform was 
politically feasible since the DPP would veto it, but by linking the reform to another 
issue a deal was made possible. Putnam has observed that what he calls synergetic 
issue linkages can be employed between the international and the domestic level of 
two-level bargaining in order to enable mutually acceptable agreements in both 
arenas.8 In this case the linkage was made between the Schengen Agreement, an 
international agreement pertaining to the international arena, and the national 
arena of domestic politics. However, whilst introducing the international arena 
allowed the Danish government to overcome the deadlock, it also introduced new 
actors that would have to react to what was portrayed as a breach of the 
Schengen  acquis. What started off as a simple negotiation game between a 
number of Danish parties over economic policy thus became a two-level game, 
where the Danish government tried to preserve the agreement and its European 
partners attempted to pressure it to cave in.  
 
It had long been a much-vaunted goal for the DPP to reinstate border controls, 
which it argued would stem the tide of illegal immigrants, illicit goods and criminal 
gangs from Eastern Europe. As such, the rhetoric of the DPP conveyed the impression 
that the agreement would be a flagrant infringement of the Schengen Agreement. 
The government had chosen a more modest language and insisted that it would 
stay within Schengen,9 but unlike the DPP was not very outspoken about this when 
the deal was announced. Instead, it allowed the DPP to make the most out of the 
                                                 
7 Ritzau, ”"DF kræver grænsebomme for efterløn”, Berlingske, 26 April 2011. 
8 Putnam, op.cit. 
9 Ritzau, ”Tyskland takker for droppet grænsekontrol”, B.T., 6 November 2011.  Malthe Munkøe 
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symbolic concession even if the DPP may have used overly strong language in its 
depiction of the agreement. This predictably  prompted a strong  response at the 
European level. 
 
The European level: complying with the Schengen Agreement 
 
For onlookers on Danish politics, the impression in May 2011 was that the Schengen 
Agreement was effectively being circumvented by the centre-right government and 
its DPP ally. Newspapers reported that border controls were to be re-introduced in 
blatant disregard of Schengen, 10 and if this interpretation was inaccurate, the 
government did nothing to correct it. As Danish professor Marlene Wind noted, ”a 
signal has been sent abroad that this truly is a return to border controls. And because 
nobody has contradicted (DPP leader) Pia Kjærsgaard, it is of course understood as 
such abroad”.11 
 
In practice, Denmark's two neighbouring countries, Sweden and Germany, would 
feel the impact of reinforced border controls  the most.  Germany  in particular 
decided to pursue a very active interest in relation to the proposed measures for the 
Danish borders. 
 
Not only was the Danish move a clear challenge to the Schengen border regime, it 
also came at a time where other European stakeholders were particularly sensitive. 
There were signs that the system was under pressure, and France and Italy had 
recently put forward a proposal to temporary suspend Schengen membership for 
countries  that fail  to stem the tide of illegal immigration  in light  of the immense 
pressure of illegal immigration across the Mediterranean. If one country could 
reinstate border control checks in violation of the Schengen Agreement, this might 
soon engender similar moves elsewhere, like a house of cards collapsing. German 
Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle insisted that the measures to be undertaken be 
Schengen-compatible and warned that freedom enjoyed in today's Europe could 
be jeopardized by such developments.12 
                                                 
10 I. Traynor, “EU warns Denmark over border controls”, The Guardian, 13 May 2011. 
11 Marlene Wind quoted in ”EU-ekspert: Danmark er ved at gentage Muhammed-fejlen”, 
Politiken, 9 June 2011.  
12 Guido Westerwelle quoted in Ritzau, edited by U. Søgaard Thomsen, ”Tyskland fastholder 
kritik af grænsekontrol” DR, 15 June 2011.  EU Diplomacy Paper 1/2012 
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A strong German pressure on Denmark ensued. A  German Minister for European 
Affairs  in  Hessen,  Jürg-Uwe Hahn,  gained much public attention when he 
encouraged Germans to boycott holidays in Denmark, 13  and most forcefully, 
Chancellor Angela Merkel had a telephone conversation with Danish Prime Minister 
Løkke Rasmussen.14 During the June 2011 European Council summit many heads of 
government had informal consultations with the Danish Prime Minister on the matter. 
Prior to the summit, the Danish Foreign Minister Lene Espersen had been in Berlin to 
meet  her counterpart Westerwelle, but despite her insistence  that the Schengen 
Agreement would not be violated, the Germans remained skeptical.  
 
At one point the Danish Minister of Taxation Peter Christensen indicated in a 
communiqué to the parliamentary committee on taxation that the diplomatic crisis 
had been caused by a misinterpretation abroad that the Danes intended to 
reintroduce passport controls, rather than just customs checks. 15  However, a 
Commission spokeswoman forcefully rejected the  interpretation  that the 
international criticism was conditioned on a misreading of the agreement and was 
quoted as saying that any “permanent and systematic control is not permitted”, 
adding  that “it is difficult to imagine a permanent customs control without a 
corresponding identity control”.16  
 
The European Commission also chose to pursue an active role in the debacle. The 
President of the Commission José  Manuel Barroso directly  contacted  the Danish 
head of state. In a letter to the Danish Prime Minister, he wrote: 
As you know, the European Commission has already expressed its grave 
concerns about the announced measures, which appear to put into 
question the smooth functioning of Europe's single  market and the 
benefits that an integrated area without internal borders brings for both 
businesses and citizens. […w]hilst  the European Commission is fully 
committed to ensuring that this dialogue results in a satisfactory outcome, 
I must recall that if necessary we will take all necessary steps to ensure the 
full respect of the relevant law”.17 
 
                                                 
13 ”Europaminister fordert Dänemark-Boykott”, Der Spiegel, 5 July 2011. 
14 Ritzau, ”Merkel hænger Løkke til tørre i grænsesag”, Berlingske, 24 June 2011.  
15 ”Skatteminister: EU har misforstået os”, DR, 27 May 2011. 
16 “EU går I rette med Peter Christiansen”, Politiken, 10 June 2011. 
17 J.M. Barroso, Personal correspondence from Mr. Jose Barroso to Prime Minister Lars Løkke 
Rasmussen, 13 May 2011. Malthe Munkøe 
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As such he used all the means at his disposal to put pressure on the Danish 
government.  President  Barroso further warned that the preliminary analysis of the 
Commission’s legal service had suggested the Danish plans were not in accordance 
with Schengen rules, and  posited that the burden of proof that the measures 
implemented would not violate international law or secondary national law should 
be on the individual country. It was becoming clear  that the new Danish border 
control regime would be subjected the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. A 
team of Commission experts that had conducted a study into the proposed designs 
for the border controls were also inconclusive and prompted Commissioner of 
Justice and Home Affairs Malmström to release the following communiqué: 
Unfortunately, the mission did not enable us to get adequate answers to 
our questions. There are persistent concerns about the compatibility of 
Denmark's strengthened internal control measures with the freedoms 
provided under the EU Treaty including the Schengen acquis.  It is 
incumbent on Denmark to demonstrate factually that the gravity of the 
situation justifies putting in place controls which might affect the exercise 
of free movement of goods, services and persons at the internal borders 
with Germany and Sweden. [...] The Commission will not hesitate to use all 
tools at its disposal to guarantee free movement of goods, services and 
persons and the full respect of EU legislation.18 
 
This strategy of trying to affect the position of the other party is often called 
reverberation. Putnam notes, however, that reverberation can also be negative and 
aim to apply foreign pressure to create a domestic backlash.19 This was exactly what 
occurred.  
 
As mentioned, illegal immigration had for some time prompted proposals to suspend 
the Schengen Agreement, and in some countries intra-border checks had been put 
in place in lieu of proper border controls. Many therefore felt the Danish move might 
spell doom for Schengen altogether  by openly challenging it. The ineffectual 
European response and the fact that it had been sidelined by heads of state in 
responding to the accelerating sovereign debt crisis made it opportune for the 
Commission to take a high-profiled role in resolving the matter of the Danish border 
controls. Also, the Danish Prime Minister had been in power only since mid-2008 and 
had presumably not had the opportunity to build a comprehensive network among 
                                                 
18 European Commission,  “Persistent concerns about Danish border control measures – 
European Commission to intensify monitoring”, Press Release, 18 July 2011.  
19 Putnam, op.cit., p. 456. EU Diplomacy Paper 1/2012 
 
13 
 
his European peers which could help him get the benefit of the doubt until the 
details of  the border control system were hammered out. Instead, the Danish 
government came under close scrutiny by the Commission, which even sent a team 
of legal experts to monitor the exact implications of the reinforced border control, 
and faced international pressure, particularly from the German government. 
 
The dilemma for the Danish government 
 
As pressure mounted on the Danish government it retracted somewhat and insisted 
that the deal struck with the DPP would not violate the Schengen Agreement. While 
the Eurosceptic DPP seemed pleased that the heavy-handed response from Brussels 
demonstrated the ineptitude of Danish politicians to regulate their own affairs, the 
government did not want an international incident and quite possibly a trial at the 
ECJ that it hardly could  expect to win. The matter of contention therefore soon 
came to resolve around the exact contents of the new border control. Would it, as 
the initial press releases and media coverage had suggested, entail the 
reintroduction of the border controls abolished under Schengen? Or would it be a 
system of minor intra-border checks to fight trafficking and other types of crime? 
 
In a policy brief the Danish think-tank on foreign policy DIIS aptly concluded that  
much indicates that  it is impossible to reconcile domestic and foreign 
policy concerns. In the coming months Denmark fundamentally has two 
options: sticking to the agreement on border control that was presented 
in May 2011, or caving in by ensuring in liaison with the Commission that 
Danish border control is compatible with the Schengen acquis.20 
 
The situation was obviously unattractive on many accounts for the Danish 
government, which was struggling to avoid losing face and political credibility. If it 
was seen as bowing to pressure from the EU it would lose much respect domestically 
only months before the general election, but it was also clear that it would and 
could not unilaterally violate the Schengen Agreement. In other words, it would have 
to lose either at the domestic level or in the European-level game. Its simultaneous 
claims that the deal would be fully Schengen-compatible yet still reintroduce the 
border controls that Schengen had abolished were close to self-contradictory. 
                                                 
20  T.  Gammeltoft-Hansen and J.  Herschend Christoffersen, “Danmarks  Dilemma: 
Grænsekontrol og Schengen”, DIIS Policy Brief, Copenhagen, Danish Institute for International 
Studies, June 2011 [author’s translation]. Malthe Munkøe 
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An attempted solution: constructive ambiguity 
 
The crucial question was thus whether the proposed deal would be in line with 
Schengen. The only way to answer it was to evaluate the exact specifications of the 
proposed arrangements, but as the Commission's team of legal experts found out, 
the  specificities were still shrouded in uncertainty. It seems clear that the 
particularities had not been established during the initial negotiations between the 
DPP and the government, since priority was given to finding a compromise that 
allowed for a speedy settlement on the pension reform the deal was nested in. 
 
When the international consequences became obvious, the government began to 
backtrack  from  its position and insisted that the agreement would comply with 
Denmark's international obligations,  as mentioned above. The government also 
underlined the fact that the proposed measures would correspond to what is 
already practiced in Germany, Sweden and other places.21 The Minister of Justice 
Lars Barfoed also said that there “had been no written study of the legal implications 
in the proposed measures”,22 which must be taken as a strong indication that the 
Danish government began to worry that the situation might end with a lost trial 
before the European Court of Justice. In other words, the government decided to 
respond to the international criticism by assuring its European partners that their fears 
were unfounded. But convincing the other governments and the Commission that 
this was indeed the case required more concrete details on the border control 
regime to be implemented. 
 
The vagueness of the deal that had initially served the Danish government turned out 
to be a double-edged sword. It had allowed the DPP to present the package deal 
as a major concession to compensate for the fact that it backed  an unpopular 
economic reform, but also made it impossible to refute the consternation that 
Denmark was balking at the Schengen Agreement. Moreover, as the issue became 
politicized it became pertinent that the government could detail exactly what it 
purported to do. 
                                                 
21 Ritzau,  ”Uforstående minister: Tyskland praktiserer jo samme grænsekontrol”,  Politiken, 31 
May 2011. 
22  K.  Pedersen, ”Grænseslagsmål foregår I blinde”,  Politiken, 10 June 2011  [author’s 
translation]. EU Diplomacy Paper 1/2012 
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On 8 June 2011, therefore, the government put forward a more detailed agreement, 
backed up by an international press release in English. The press release began by 
noting that ”[o]n May 11 2011 the Danish government and the Danish Peoples Party 
concluded an agreement on strengthening the customs border controls in 
Denmark”. 23 There was no reference to ”reinstating” or ”reintroducing” border 
controls as the DPP had proudly proclaimed in Danish media following the 
conclusion of the deal. The international text could also dismiss concerns on other 
accounts by noting that 
[t]he agreement aims first and foremost at enhancing customs control 
and implies increased controls in relation to the smuggling into Denmark 
of mainly goods and items. The agreement also implies a strengthening of 
policing in order to enable the Danish police to act upon specific requests 
from customs officers. However, this does not mean that the Danish police 
will be permanently present at the border. It also is important to bear in 
mind that the agreement in no way implies that the police will carry out 
checks on individuals at the Danish border, just as there is no question of 
introducing passport control in relation to the other Schengen States. 
During the negotiations, the Danish Government has paid close attention 
to ensuring that the agreement is fully compliant with Denmark's EU 
obligations. The government will naturally continue to do so during the 
implementation phase. 
The Danish Government and the relevant authorities are engaged in a 
dialogue with the Commission about the practical implementation of the 
agreement. A meeting between the Commission and the Danish 
Government has been held in order to clarify a number of points where 
misunderstandings might have occurred regarding the precise nature of 
the Danish efforts to enhance customs control. The Danish Government 
will provide the Commission with further information and expects the 
dialogue to continue.24 
 
This seemed to address all the concerns raised against the border control agreement. 
Border controls would only be ”enhanced  […]  in relation to the smuggling into 
Denmark of mainly goods and items”.25 The Schengen Agreement does allow for 
certain checks in relation to preventing smuggling of illicit goods. Also, the text 
stresses that the Danish police will not be permanently present at the border and 
that the police will not carry out checks on individuals at the Danish border or 
passport checks. Finally, it emphasizes the fact that there is an ongoing dialogue 
                                                 
23 Ministry of Taxation, The Danish agreement on border controls, 8 June 2011.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. Malthe Munkøe 
16 
 
between the Danish government and the Commission which can help  ”clarify a 
number of points where misunderstandings might have occurred”.26 This press release 
in other words dismissed all concerns that the agreement would not live up to the 
requirements of the Schengen Agreement. 
 
However, the Danish government soon came under fire as the English version of the 
text was manifestly not a translation or a summary of the original Danish agreement. 
Danish news media reported the incongruence  of the two text versions, and the 
Social Democratic spokesman on financial affairs,  Morten Bødskov,  commented 
that ”[t]o the Danish People's Party and the Danes there is one content, and when 
explaining itself to its European counterparts in English, the agreement takes on an 
entirely different character”.27 He also said he would ask the government to clarify 
which agreement was the real one, the Danish or English one. 
 
The Danish version was entitled ”Permanent border control in Denmark 
(strengthened border control)”. According to the agreement,  the objective is 
a ”substantial strengthening and permanent and visible control at the Danish border 
crossings”.28 The scope of the agreement also appears broader in the Danish text, 
which notes that the measures will ”not least concern theft and robberies committed 
by gangs of foreigners, the trafficking of drugs, weapons, persons and large sums of 
money and tax avoidance from the Danish state by using foreign labour”.29 The 
Danish text thus appears much more heavy-handed than the English text. 
 
Given the importance of the matter this can hardly be put down to errors in the 
translation or general neglect with regard to the particular phrases employed. 
Instead, this would appear to be an example of what is often termed ‘constructive 
ambiguity’, that is, the use of wordings that are deliberately left sufficiently vague to 
                                                 
26 Ibid.  
27 N. Braagaard,”To tekstudgaver af grænsekontrol”, Nyhederne, TV2, 11 June 2011 [author’s 
translation]. 
28 Ministry of Finance, ”Permanent grænsekontrol i Danmark (aftale om styrket grænse-
kontrol)”, Press Release, May 2011 [author’s translation].  
29 Ibid. EU Diplomacy Paper 1/2012 
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support two or more dissimilar interpretations.30 It allows two or more sides to accept 
a text even though substantial disagreement persists. 
 
The strategy of employing constructive ambiguity seems  to have been adopted 
when publishing two different text documents in English and in Danish. The Danish 
text is comprehensive while the English text is more of a short summary. Furthermore 
the English version supported the interpretation the Danish government wanted to 
convey at the European level, whilst the Danish interpretation catered to the DPP 
and supported its claims of having ensured the reinstatement of border controls to 
stem the tide of criminal activities into the country. It also speaks of ”mobile control 
teams, who will carry out visible and targeted customs control etc. of the travelers”.31 
Finally, the Danish text specified that the Danish government would actively pursue 
an amendment of Schengen to allow for a temporary suspension of the accord in 
cases of massive immigration or the failure of one or more member states to properly 
secure the external border. 
 
In both versions, a number of measures to be undertaken were listed. An additional 
98 man-years would be allocated to increase the number of customs officers at the 
borders, and new permanent facilities were to be established at border crossings, 
with ”a daily presence of customs officers”. Both versions make clear that this is a 
customs control, backed up by police officers who are not stationed directly at the 
border, rather than a systematic check on every individual seeking to enter Danish 
territory. 
 
In substantive terms, the agreement as it was portrayed in both languages therefore 
ultimately appeared to implement a permanent presence of customs officers 
carrying out control checks to stem the tide of illegal trafficking of illicit goods, 
persons and other criminal activity, but not of police officers. From a diplomatic point 
of view,  the wordings employed in the two communications differed enough to 
allow the government to calm its European partners while maintaining that the deal 
involved significant new measures. As such, the Danish government tried to reconcile 
                                                 
30 C.  Bell,  The Conventions of Crisis: A Study of Diplomatic Management, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1971; P. Dražen, “Use of Ambiguities in Peace Agreements”, in Language and 
Diplomacy, DiploProjects, 2001, pp. 163-200. 
31  Ministry of Finance, ”Permanent grænsekontrol i Danmark (aftale om styrket 
grænsekontrol)”, op.cit.  Malthe Munkøe 
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the need to maintain the support of the DPP with the necessity of resolving the 
diplomatic crisis at the European level by the strategic use of ambiguous language 
in its communications. Ultimately, the Schengen-compatibility of the actual measures 
implemented would be closely evaluated in terms of the international obligations 
Denmark had assumed. The Commission maintained its decision to monitor closely 
the development of the new and permanent customs checks, and the Germans 
also remained wary of the proposed initiatives. But at least the matter was 
temporarily settled as  the Commission would have to await the actual 
implementation before it could examine whether the Schengen Agreement  was 
indeed  violated. This gave the Danish government a respite from a strong 
international pressure which had caused it to lose face and frustrated its attempt to 
set a domestic agenda which could help it claw back victory in  the upcoming 
election. 
 
The endgame of border control 
 
As more customs officers were deployed on the borders and the construction of new 
permanent facilities planned, these measures were watched with intense attention 
from European capitals. Meanwhile the Danish government had gradually become 
more prone to emphasizing that the measures would not infringe on the Schengen 
Agreement. On 29 August 2011, a Danish newspaper even cited a prominent DPP 
politician who demanded that the Minister of Taxation confirm his ”loyalty” to the 
deal after he had publicly described it as a series of ”sample-based controls”.32 ”We 
did not agree anything concerning some sample-based control. We agreed to a 
permanent border control”, he fumed.33 The change of language, from ”substantial 
strengthening” and ”permanent” to ”sample-based” border control, was a crucial 
element in the Danish government’s attempt to make the measures more 
acceptable to the European level – albeit at the cost of enraging the DPP. This again 
demonstrated how the government had gradually retracted from its original deal 
with the DPP by changing the language used to depict the arrangement. 
 
In the end, the debacle came to a definite end as the centre-right government was 
ousted in the September 2011 general election. The new government immediately 
                                                 
32 Quoted in Ritzau,”DF: Skatteminister skal bevise sin loyalitet over for grænsekontrollen”, 
Politiken, 29 August 2011. 
33 Ibid. [author’s translation]. EU Diplomacy Paper 1/2012 
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reassured its European partners of its intent to abide by the Schengen Agreement 
and that the establishment  of ”permanent” facilities at  the border would be 
cancelled.34 Instead of increasing the number of customs officers present on border 
crossings, the new government announced plans to strengthen the tax authorities 
more generally to fight trafficking, smuggling and tax avoidance.  
 
The new government did not consider itself bound by the deal struck by the centre-
right parties with the DPP, and with the Danish EU presidency coming up it was a 
welcome opportunity to establish good rapport and generate a sense of goodwill 
among the other European countries. This was met with relief in Berlin and Brussels.35 
The prospect of a ”permanent” border control, whether in the form of customs 
checks or other checks, sounded too much like a proper border.  
 
In many respects, the issue was of greater symbolic than practical importance. The 
DPP had wanted to establish once and for all that there would be some border 
control when entering Danish soil, but had not been overly specific about what that 
would entail insomuch as it would counter cross-border crime.  According to  DPP 
politician Thulesen Dahl,  
[b]order controls were torn down ten years ago due to EU cooperation on 
free movement. But also due to the fact that borders were seen as the 
scars of history. For the supporters of the EU, border controls have been 
the very symbol to mark that the characteristics of nation-states are being 
erased […] This deal contains both something practical in terms of fighting 
cross-border crime, but it is also symbolic that things are now back to 
where they were ten years ago.36  
 
The Germans in particular were, conversely, haunted by the memories of a deeply 
divided Europe, as Foreign Minister Westerwelle said clearly after a meeting with his 
Danish colleague, and opposed any moves to recreate borders even though the 
DPP leader had explained that ”most people will get only a friendly nod”37 rather 
than being subjected to a actual check when crossing the border. 
 
                                                 
34 Ritzau, ”Rød regering sløjfer blå grænsekontrol”, Information, 1 November 2011.  
35 Ritzau, ”Tyskland takker for droppet grænsekontrol”, B.T., 6 November 2011.  
36 Quoted in M. Hjortdal, “DF fejrer grænsekontrol med baconchips og lyserød champagne”, 
Politiken, 11 May 2011 [author’s translation]. 
37 Ritzau, ”Pia K.: De fleste får et venligt nik”, Nyhederne, TV2, 11 May 2011. Malthe Munkøe 
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The duality of politics in the modern Europe 
 
If the Danish government had thought the deal would go unnoticed in European 
capitals, it was soon dismayed to see that it instead gave rise to an outcry in Berlin 
and Brussels. This was in many ways a predictable turn of events, as Germany and 
the  European  Commission would have no choice but to react if the Schengen 
Agreement was seen as being transgressed upon. Nevertheless, it would seem that 
the strong international reaction came as a surprise to Danish policy-makers, who 
had focused their attention on getting the pension reform through.  
 
Marlene Wind noted in an interview with Danish newspaper Politiken  that ”[i]n a 
global world one cannot control what is a national agenda and what is the message 
for Brussels. International media have received the signals that have been sent in the 
domestic context, and that cannot be controlled. It is incredibly naive to believe one 
can control how this is perceived abroad.38 In other words, the attempt to play a 
two-level game by presenting different messages to either level was inherently 
flawed.  
 
A similar conclusion was reached by the Danish Institute for International Studies in an 
analysis of the debacle over border controls: ”The problem is perhaps that there is 
after all some European public, which makes it very difficult to maintain a clear 
distinction between a purely domestic and a corresponding European discourse”.39 
The government had presumably thought it could make some high-sounding 
concessions to the DPP without incurring the ire of its European partners. This 
judgment was very wrong and perhaps betrayed a fundamental misreading of the 
implications of European integration on domestic politics. Matters which are at the 
heart of the integration process receive far more attention in foreign capitals than 
the Danish government by all accounts had foreseen. 
 
This sentiment was mirrored abroad. The German daily Süddeutsche Zeitung  very 
accurately argued that  
                                                 
38 Marlene Wind quoted in M. Hjortdal,”EU-ekspert: Danmark er ved at gentage Muhammed-
fejlen”, op.cit. [author’s translation]. 
39 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Herschend Christoffersen, op.cit. [author’s translation]. EU Diplomacy Paper 1/2012 
 
21 
 
[t]his presumed misunderstanding  began when the Danish government 
thought it could spread a hard version of its plans in Denmark and a soft 
version in Europe. This results from a considerable belief in national 
boundaries. And a very limited understanding of how politics works in a 
common Europe.40 
 
In an integrated Europe, the traditional barriers between foreign and domestic 
politics can no longer feasibly be maintained. This has substantial ramifications for 
modern diplomacy in Europe. Diplomacy has traditionally been conceived as the 
conduct of foreign affairs between representatives of states insulated from society at 
large. Diplomats enjoy special privileges and their doings are usually shrouded in 
secrecy. Domestic pressures and sentiments are bypassed by the interests of the 
state, and hence foreign policy is carried out with a view only to advancing the 
political objectives of the nation free from the whims of the populace and news 
media. The debacle over the Danish border controls highlighted that this is no longer 
the case. 
 
National debates are immediately transmitted onto the European level. When the 
Danish public debate began to resolve around reintroducing border controls, it was 
of  immediate  concern for all countries in the Schengen area,  who may see the 
freedom of movement impinged upon. That lies at the very heart of European 
integration  –  by  ‘pooling sovereignty’  an issue becomes a matter of common 
concern. Insofar that the issue is important enough to warrant attention at a high 
political level, it cannot be restricted to a national context. By strengthening these 
linkages, European integration also weakens the distinction between the domestic 
and European political levels. In the same vein, for these reasons rhetoric proved to 
be of much greater importance than the Danish government would appear to have 
noticed. The use of words such as ‘permanent border control’ and ‘reinstatement of 
the border control’  that Schengen had abolished were expedient for domestic 
reasons, but were also sure to raise alarm in the neighbouring countries. 
 
International relations and domestic politics 
 
The failure to recognize the importance of politics at the international level is most 
evident from the fact that the Foreign  Ministry was not consulted during the 
                                                 
40 Quoted in Ritzau, ”Merkel hænger Løkke til tørre i grænsesag”, Berlingske, 24 June 2011.  Malthe Munkøe 
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negotiations with the DPP that resulted in a new agreement on border control.41 The 
Foreign  Minister Lene Espersen became involved in the matter only when 
international pressure began to mount, and she was given the unenviable task of 
going on an international tour around European capitals to explain how the 
agreement on reintroducing permanent border controls would not be in violation 
with the Schengen Agreement. 
 
The Danish government thus ignored the international ramifications of its domestic 
deal-making with the DPP altogether, concentrating instead on finding a settlement 
that would suffice in terms of national political concerns. In fact, the Foreign Ministry 
or its Minister was not at all involved in the domestic negotiations despite their 
consequences on Denmark's foreign relations. The Prime Minister later said that 
there ”could perhaps  have been a better advance notice” for the Foreign Ministry.42 
Foreign Minister Espersen concurred that ”as the Prime Minister said yesterday, had 
we known how the international community would react, it is possible there might 
have been a need for a different approach from the very beginning”.43 
 
The new proposed border control regime  was therefore agreed to by the 
government with the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Taxation, the latter being 
responsible for the  customs  authorities. Instead of giving advance notice to the 
international partners to pave the way for the adjustments, the change of Danish 
border control was presented as a ‘fait accompli’ that would involve a radical break 
with the status quo ante. This disregarded the stake Germany, Sweden and the other 
Schengen countries more generally had in the matter and rendered it very difficult to 
portray the agreement as anything but a unilateral decision that would infringe on 
the Schengen acquis. 
 
Historically,  international relations have been of the utmost importance for states, 
and domestic concerns were subjected to the ‘reason of the state’. The conduct of 
foreign relations was largely kept separate from national debates, and it was widely 
accepted that what was said in the secretive international circles needed not 
                                                 
41 H. Davidsen-Nielsen,”Grænseaftalen blev driblet på plads uden om Lene E.”, Politiken, 17 
June 2011. 
42 L. Simonsen,”Man skal ikke være bagklog”, Politiken, 17 June 2011 [author’s translation]. 
43 Ibid. EU Diplomacy Paper 1/2012 
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necessarily be fully congruent with public debates and rhetoric. But in this case, 
international concerns were wholly subjected to the national concern of finding a 
way to get the DPP to accept the proposed pension reform. It was seen as one of 
the last good chances for the incumbent government to turn the electoral tide and 
win reelection, and in the context of the economic crisis the financial consequences 
of removing a costly early retirement scheme was an important priority. 
 
While it remains unclear whether the omission of the Foreign Ministry was owed to a 
disregard of the international repercussions or simple negligence, it does illustrate 
how domestic concerns took priority over  international  ones.  While international 
pressure soon forced the government to soften up the evocative language of the 
original deal with the DPP, the decisive argument was probably the prospect of the 
agreement being found to be illegal in the sense of being incompatible with the 
Schengen Agreement that Denmark had ratified. As such, the debacle over border 
controls is a clear demonstration that foreign policy considerations no longer have 
the unreserved primacy they once held for political decision-makers.  
 
The changing fabric of European diplomacy 
 
What does the debacle over the new Danish border control regime in 2011 tell us 
about European-level diplomacy? Clearly, it would have been impossible to make 
such an agreement without due considerations for the international implications in a 
less benign foreign policy environment. For instance, in the historical period from 
German unification to the end of the Second World War, Danish foreign policy was 
dominated by the threat posed by Germany,  and  political  moves had to be 
perceived and evaluated in this light. National concerns have gained importance 
relative to international concerns as the immediate foreign policy environment has 
gradually become less hostile in the twentieth century. 
 
This requires decision-makers to synchronically evaluate a range of dilemmas and 
questions that pertain to domestic and international circumstances. Failing to 
understand how one is engaged in a political ‘game’ at the European level as well 
as the domestic level, which may often overlap, leads to an erroneous evaluation of 
available choices and the costs associated with different policy alternatives. These Malthe Munkøe 
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are all well-known facts, but the debacle over Danish border controls illustrates that 
they are often forgotten. 
 
This paper has explored how what originated as a purely domestic political affair 
escalated into an international debacle over Danish border controls. We have seen 
that the Danish government pursued a strategy of issue linkage to overcome the 
deadlock with regards to its proposed pension reform. It had thought it could keep 
the debate over border controls in a national context, effectively presenting one 
interpretation to the Danish population which would be expedient to the DPP and 
another to the rest of Europe. But this is not how politics functions in an integrated 
Europe, where the very rift between international and domestic affairs has lost 
relevance due to the process of European integration. Legislation from Brussels 
impacts  directly on domestic affairs, and consequently domestic affairs have in 
many instances become relevant to international partners. Accordingly, diplomacy 
no longer rests on high-flung meetings between diplomats, but increasingly becomes 
an integrated element of day-to-day policy-making. In his seminal work on two-level 
games, Robert Putnam noted that ”[d]omestic politics and international relations are 
often somehow entangled. The […] interesting questions are 'when?' and 'how?'”.44 
The debacle over the Danish border controls was a clear demonstration of the 
linkages between domestic politics and international relations in an integrated 
Europe.  Once the Danish government linked the issue of pension reforms to the issue 
of border controls, it transformed the negotiation context into a two-level game. This 
forced the Danish government to re-evaluate the agreement it had reached with 
the DPP over border controls and ensure it would be in accordance with the 
Schengen Agreement.  
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